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 
Abstract— This letter presents the first ultra-lightweight 
transmitter based on electromagnetic emanation to send 
embedded intellectual properties (IP) identity (ID) quickly and 
discreetly. The proposed solution is based on a binary frequency 
shift keying (BFSK) transmitter that ensures an exceptionally 
high data rate. In addition, we present a coherent demodulation 
method using slippery window spectral analysis to recover data 
outside the device. The hardware resources occupied by the 
transmitter represent less than 0.022% of a 130 nm Microsemi 
Fusion FPGA. The experimental bitrate of the data transmission 
is around 500 times higher than the bitrate available for other 
state of the art spy circuitry using power consumption. In 
comparison with other works, our proposal goes clearly towards 
using a spy circuit in an industrial context for IP protection. 
 
 
Index Terms—IP protection, side channel, electromagnetic 
emanation analysis.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
OR digital circuit design the re-use of embedded 
intellectual properties (IP) is more and more important due 
to prohibitive cost of ASIC design. Nevertheless the IP 
business suffers from a lack a security due to the intrinsic form 
of IPs sales and exchanges. Many dedicated threats target the 
IP life cycle and result to revenues losses for the IP designers 
[1]. The IP threat model includes illegal re-use, illegal sales, 
cloning (illegal copy) of the IP. The extent of threats targeting 
IPs is linked to the type of IP: software IPs (typically hardware 
description language files), firmware IPs (synthesized netlist), 
and hardware IPs (FPGA bitstream or physical layout).  
One of the solutions for the IP designers to protect their 
intellectual property is to be able to detect the presence of a 
copy of an IP embedded in a digital device by using IP 
identification. Works on IP watermarking and IP 
fingerprinting try to provide the IP identification service. But, 
most of the time the published solutions are not practical 
mainly because of the complexity of the 
watermarking/fingerprinting verification scheme [2]. Efficient 
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IP identification scheme needs to be contactless, rapid and 
ultra-lightweight. Up to now, these three characteristics are 
not available in the state-of-the-art. To meet these 
requirements, in this letter we propose an ultra-lightweight 
binary frequency shift keying (BFSK) transmitter to forward 
IP identity (that could be generated for example by a feedback 
shift-register or a physical unclonable function [1]) discreetly 
using an electromagnetic channel. Such circuit is usually 
called “spy circuitry”. Using the electromagnetic channel, it is 
possible to contactless check the presence of an IP inside a 
digital device. 
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we present related works. In Section 3, we detail the proposed 
electromagnetic communication of data (i.e. IC/IP 
information). In Section 4, we present a method to analyze the 
electromagnetic spectrum to BFSK signal demodulation and in 
Section 5 we present our conclusions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Well-known threat in cryptographic engineering is side 
channel attacks [3]. Most of the dynamic characteristics of 
both hardware and software implementations of cryptographic 
primitives can be used for side channel analysis: computation 
time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, optical 
radiation, even the sound produced during computation. These 
side channels can be used as transmission channels to send 
intellectual property data from a device or an embedded IP. 
For example in [4], the thermal channel representing a 
contactless communication was used to transfer information 
from an embedded tag to a remote receiver. However the 
embedded thermal tag used in this commercial solution 
requires a relatively large area (255 Spartan-3 slices). In [5], 
the authors propose using two shift registers to generate a 
recognizable signature-dependent power consumption pattern 
to reveal the IP signature. Power consumption was also used 
in [6] to communicate the IP identity. To reinforce such work, 
the authors of [7] propose using the power supply signal of an 
IP as a physical hash function for fingerprinting.  
Related works can be found also in the malicious 
hardware field such as hardware Trojans design. Such systems 
use side channels to forward secret information such as a 
symmetric cipher key from cryptographic hardware 
implementation [8], [9], but also to cause or to amplify side-
channel leakage of cryptographic hardware [10]. 
Except [4], all the related works use power consumption as 
a communication channel which is not contactless. Unlike the 
proposed solution, all the related works are not lightweight 
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and rapid as this letter will show. 
III. PROPOSED EM COMMUNICATION OF DEEP DATA 
Electromagnetic radiation is an efficient side channel since, 
unlike measurement of power consumption, electromagnetic 
radiation can be measured locally. One of the main advantages 
of this side channel is that it is impossible to hide the leak 
concerning electromagnetic radiation by using a global 
countermeasure. Moreover the electromagnetic test bench is 
not expensive (less than US$ 10K without an oscilloscope, 
which is the most expensive component). Last but not least, a 
spectral analysis of the electromagnetic radiation provides 
information on the oscillating structure such as a ring-
oscillator [11]. For all these reasons, we use the 
electromagnetic channel for our IP identification scheme. To 
this end, we designed an ultra-lightweight BFSK transmitter 
which could be activated outside the device by an ID checker 
or internally by a specific event (e.g. specific input sequence, 
internal data value, system state). Note that an enable signal is 
required to reduce the power consumed by the ring oscillator. 
Moreover, a permanently activated transmitter could be 
detected more easily by a spectral analysis of electromagnetic 
emanations of the device and could also cause local heating 
and premature aging of the chip. 
BFSK is one of the common modulation schemes used in 
digital communication. The binary data are sent using a 
sinusoidal carrier at two frequency tones f0 and f1, representing 
high (‘1’) and low (‘0’) logic levels. The binary data arriving 
at the transmitter input at certain bitrates determine the 
commutation of the tones at the transmitter output. The 
proposed BFSK transmitter uses a dedicated configurable 
ring-oscillator, as shown in Figure 1. The configurable ring-
oscillator is designed using one multiplexor, N+K delay 
elements, and a feedback chain controlled by a NAND gate for 
activation of transmission to reduce power consumption. 
Actually, the transmitter is used only during a short time when 
the enable signal is high, and it consumes power only during 
this small piece of time. The power consumption of this 
transmitter is thus completely negligible. 
Input data controls the multiplexor, as shown in Figure 1. 
When input data is low, the configurable ring oscillator uses N 
delays and its oscillation frequency is f0. When input data is 
high, the configurable ring oscillator uses N+K delays and its 
oscillation frequency is f1. Since the ring oscillator’s 
oscillation frequency decreases with an increase in the number 
of delay elements, frequency f0 is higher than frequency f1. 
These two frequencies have to be selected according to the 
bandwidth of the electromagnetic analysis platform, which is 
used to acquire and measure the transmitted signal. The 
bandwidth of our test bench, which is presented in [11], was 
limited to 100 MHz and 1 GHz by the low-noise amplifier. 
The proposed BFSK transmitter was implemented in 
Microsemi FUSION flash based FPGA (130 nm CMOS 
technology) containing 600K logic gates (M7AFS600). The 
device contains 13 824 tiles, each tile can be used to 
implement one D-flip-flop or one configurable multiplexor-
based logic block implementing any 3-input logic function. 
The configurable number of delays in the configurable ring 
oscillator of the proposed BFSK transmitter makes it possible 
to select precisely the two frequencies f0 and f1 using 
parameters N and K. Fig. 2 shows the configurable ring 
oscillator frequencies evolution with N ranging from 0 to 4, 
and K ranging from 1 to 5. According to Fig. 2, f0 can be 
chosen between 119 MHz (N=4) and 385 MHz (N=0) and f1 
can be chosen between 70 MHz (N=4, K=5) and 280 MHz 
(N=0, K=1).  
 
The number of FUSION tiles used by the BFSK transmitter 
is very low, i.e. from 3 tiles (N=0, K=1) to 11 tiles (N=4, 
K=5). These values are equivalent to less than 0.022% and 
less than 0.080% of the total number of tiles included in the 
targeted 600K-gate FUSION FPGA, respectively. This very 
small number of tiles is very promising for good dissimulation 
of the BFSK transmitter inside the sea of gates/tiles. For 
XILINX and ALTERA SRAM FPGAs the BFSK consumes 
from 2 4-input- LUT (N=0, K=1) to 10 4-input- LUT (N=4, 
K=5). To evaluate its size in ASIC implementations, the gate 
count is estimated using the Virtual Silicon  standard cell 
library based on the UMC L180 0.18 µm 1P6M Logic process 
(UMCL18G212T3 [12]).  The delay gate count is estimated by 
the gate count of a standard NOT gate, 0.67 EG, and that of 
the standard multiplexor, 2.33 EG. The standard NAND gate 
uses 1 EG. So the number of gates of the whole BFSK 
transmitter ranges from 4.67 EG (N = 0, K = 1) to 10.03 EG 
(N = 4, K = 5). Note that one flip-flop requires between 5.33 
EG and 12.33 EG to store a single bit [12].  
 The small requirement of logical resources of the proposed 
spy circuitry makes reverse engineering it harder, although not 
impossible [13]. Even with recent CMOS technologies, the 
attacker can reverse engineer ICs using a scanning electron 
 
Fig. 1. Architecture of the ultra-lightweight digital BFSK transmitter based on 
a configurable ring oscillator.  
 
Fig. 2. Evolution of the configurable ring oscillator frequencies (f0 and f1) 
with N ranging from 0 to 4, and K ranging from 1 to 5.  
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microscope and an automatic tool for circuitry extraction [13], 
[14]. Nevertheless, the smaller the piece of hardware used for 
BFSK transmitter the harder it is to detect during reverse 
engineering. Detection of the transmitter using standard 
Trojan detection methods [15], [16] is not feasible because the 
transmitter does not change the data path of the circuit and 
because of the ultra-low signal-to-noise ratio on the 
electromagnetic channel, as shown in our experimental results 
below (Section 4). 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The electromagnetic radiation of the device was evaluated 
using the near-field electromagnetic analysis test bench 
described in [11] with a spectral range limited to 100 MHz and 
1 GHz. Standard devices aimed at direct BFSK demodulation 
cannot be used for these relatively high frequencies. Available 
integrated BFSK demodulators are limited to a few dozen 
megahertz. For this reason, we developed a dedicated BFSK 
demodulation scheme for our needs, in which a spectral 
analysis of the low noise amplifier output (a component of the 
test bench) is performed to measure the f0 and f1 spectral 
contribution. The transmitted high (low) level is detected 
when f1 spectral contribution is higher (lower) than that of f0. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the spectral analysis of the BFSK 
transmitter’s electromagnetic emission when N = 1 and K = 1, 
which corresponds to a small transmitter with high frequencies 
(f1=189.2 MHz and f0=272.2 MHz). For the spectral analysis, a 
16 384 points FFT was computed. This figure presents a zoom 
(X and Y axis) on the global spectrum of the local EM 
emanation of the circuit when the BFSK transmitter sends a 
‘1’ (in red) and when the BFSK transmitter sends a ‘0’ (in 
blue).  
Notice also that we placed a small antenna in the close 
vicinity of the ring. The amplitude of the spectral rays at 180, 
200, 220, 240, 260, 280 MHz are very high compared to the 
two spectral rays at 189.2 MHz and 272.2 MHz. However, we 
have cut the upper part of the spectrum in order to see the two 
interesting rays (at 189.2 MHz and 272.2 MHz). These 
frequencies correspond to the spectral contribution of the 
BFSK frequencies f0 and f1. 
Without knowledge of the BFSK parameters, the 
electromagnetic transmission cannot be easily detected 
because it cannot be distinguished from spectral noise. The 
signal-to-noise ratio of the BFSK transmission in Fig. 3 is -
135 dB for a 1 GHz bandwidth. Such an ultra-low SNR 
represents efficient protection against unwanted BFSK 
transmitter detection via a side channel. However, knowing 
the N and K parameters, the BFSK designer can calibrate the 
demodulation (determine the two frequencies) by 
electromagnetic analysis of the ring oscillators based on the 
differential spectral analysis according to [11]. 
The spectral contribution of the two BFSK frequencies 
during transmission (which is limited by the transmitter enable 
signal) at the low-noise amplifier output is measured to 
determine the transmitted bit sequence. In order to apply the 
demodulation technique described here, called coherent 
demodulation, theoretically the bitstream rate (bitrate) is 
limited to 0.5 times the frequency difference between f0 and f1. 
In the case shown in Fig. 3, theoretically the maximum bitrate 
is 41.5 Mbps (theoretically limited to 53 Mbps when N = 0 
and K = 1). The bitrate of best IP identification methods using 
power consortium in the literature  is always less than 1 Kbps 
even with recent device (i.e. XILINX Virtex V) [6-9]. 
For the coherent demodulation of the electromagnetic 
radiation, we propose a slippery window spectral analysis. 
Indeed, overall spectral analysis masks the effects of the 
nonstationarity of the signal and therefore provides no 
information about its temporal evolution. Slippery window 
spectral analysis is a three-dimensional representation of the 
signal: amplitude, frequency, and time. It requires two 
quantities Fw, the width of the FFT window frame and the 
difference Δτ between two frames. For our experiment, we 
chose Fw equal to 16 384 points (2
14
-point FFT) and Δτ equal 
to 100 points. For each frame, the FFT provides the software 
demodulator with the amplitude of signals f0 and f1 which 
enables the demodulator to distinguish between a transmitted 
1 or 0. 
To illustrate data transmission from the circuit via the EM 
channel, we used a shift register that stored the following 16-
bit sequence: “1011110111011100”. The clock frequency of 
the shift register is 500 kHz. When the enable signal of the 
transmitter is given, the sequence is sent cyclically to the 
BFSK transmitter, which transmits it via the electromagnetic 
channel. Fig. 4 gives the result of the coherent demodulation 
obtained at a 500 Kbps bit rate (500 times more than [6-9]), 
which served as a proof of concept. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this letter, we have presented an ultra-lightweight 
transmitter of IP identity using the electromagnetic side 
channel for FPGA implantation. Based on a configurable ring 
oscillator, our solution exploits a BFSK signal to transmit 
information by way of the electromagnetic channel. By 
performing a slippery window spectral analysis of the near 
 
Fig. 3. Parts (zoom in x-axis and y-axis) of the electromagnetic emanation 
spectral analysis of the proposed BFSK transmitter when it sends a high level 
at f1=189.2MHz (in red) and when it sends a low level at f0=272.2 MHz (in 
blue). 
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field electromagnetic emanations captured locally over the 
BFSK transmitter circuitry, the proposed transmission 
achieves a high bitrate (theoretically limited to 53 Mbps with a 
Microsemi Fusion FPGA), which has not been achieved 
before. Moreover, the transmitter occupies very small area. 
For the highest frequency and data rate, our solution requires 
4.67 equivalent gates, which it is less than the requirement of a 
small D-flip-flop. Such a small area makes reverse 
engineering of the chip very difficult and detection of the 
transmitter using standard Trojan detection methods is not 
realistic. 
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amplitude of the spectral contribution at f1=189.2 MHz (at f0=272.2 MHz). 
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